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Abstract
We compare the magnitude of, and welfare generated by, uniform welfare-maximising,
Ramsey and monopoly pricing in email networks. Messages are defined by the utility
they give to their sender and receiver. Senders tend to pay more than receivers when the
average sender utility is higher than the average receiver utility, and vice versa. When
message preference distributions are symmetric receivers pay more than senders. Be-
cause prices cannot be (too) negative, the interior solutions for all price types hold only
when the distributions for sender and receiver utility are similar. The comparative wel-
fare analysis shows that in some situations the use of uniform, Ramsey and zero prices
will not generate substantial welfare losses relative to feasible perfectly discriminatory
prices. Monopoly prices are unlikely to be efficient.
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1 Introduction
Economists usually trust in the power of prices to influence peoples’ behavior yet, to date, only
technical and regulatory controls have been used to any extent in email networks. Possibly
because pricing in telephone networks is so well understood, there has also been very little
consideration given to pricing in email networks in the literature. We contend, however,
that there are significant differences between telephone and email networks and that these
differences mean that the findings from the telephone network literature are not universally
applicable to email networks. Before ISPs or regulators can seriously consider introducing
sender and receiver prices they need to have a better understanding of what exactly prices
can achieve in email networks, how sender and receiver prices can be best used to achieve
economic goals such as maximising welfare, how close to maximum welfare do we get with
the status quo of zero prices, and what is the level of the efficient and profit-maximizing
prices. We address these matters in this paper.
Communication in a telephone network is a one-stage process that requires two specific
actions to occur - communication occurs if and only if a call that is made is also answered.
In the literature on telephone networks it is assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that if a call
is made but not answered there are no costs imposed on any party. In effect, unless a
connection is made between sender and receiver it is as if nothing has happened. Certainly
a caller is never required to pay for calls that are unanswered. Moreover, because models
of telephone networks assume that everything happens simultaneously there is no loss of
generality associated with modeling the value of a message to either party as net of that
party’s processing cost.
In email networks, on the other hand, communication occurs only after a specific three-
stage sequence of actions. In the first stage a message is sent by the sender, is transmitted
by the ISP to the receiver and enters into the receiver’s mailbox. At this stage the sender
incurs a processing cost of drafting the message and pays the sender price (if there is one),
the ISP incurs the cost of transmitting the message, and an unavoidable cost of processing
the message is imposed on the receiver. The receiver’s processing cost is actually incurred in
stage two when the receiver processes the message, but the fact that the message has entered
into the receiver’s mailbox renders this cost unavoidable. In stage two, the receiver chooses
to delete or to open the message and a processing cost associated with making and executing
this choice is incurred. This processing cost is sunk and so does not influence the receiver’s
decision to open the message or not. However, the receiver price, paid only if the receiver
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chooses to open a message, is not sunk. In stage three, the receiver of a message chooses
whether or not to read a message that has been opened and if the message is read both the
sender and the receiver realize the potential utility of the message. Clearly in email networks
it is not reasonable to model the values of a message to the sender and the receiver as net of
their processing costs because their costs of processing are incurred regardless of whether the
value of the message is realized, that is, regardless of whether the messages is read or not.
The distinction between opening and reading an email message is an important one. The
ISP can only observe whether a message is opened and so payment of the receiver price must
be based on this action and not on whether or not it has been read. If the receiver price is
positive, a receiver will not choose to open a message she does not intend to read. However,
if the receiver price is negative the receiver will open all messages and read only those that
generate positive utility for her. This means that negative receiver prices cannot achieve
anything useful in email networks, which in turn means that perfectly discriminatory prices
cannot achieve first-best welfare outcomes if some messages generate negative receiver utility.
Our model of the email network incorporates the three stage process of communication
described above into the pioneering analysis of Hermalin and Katz (2004). Hermalin and
Katz examine email pricing in a framework where the unit of interest is a message. Each
message generates net utility for sender and receiver according to some bivariate distribution.
In our viewpoint, one of the main contributions of Hermalin and Katz is the setup that
incorporates a very rich preference structure without the need to keep track of the identities
of the sender and receiver of each message exchange. These together allow for new insights to
be derived about uniform sender and receiver prices (social welfare maximizing, Ramsey and
profit maximising prices are considered). While we have seen uniform prices before in the
literature for telephone pricing, this was previously accomplished by assuming either that
everyone is the same or that everyone is different but from the viewpoint of any network
participant everyone else is the same.1 Thus, demand heterogeneity was one-dimensional,
whereas Hermalin and Katz framework allows for investigation of uniform prices with a much
richer, two-dimensional heterogeneity. However, the opportunity cost of having the unit of
interest be a message rather than a consumer is that the framework cannot be used to analyze
access decisions or competition between providers because these require information on the
preferences of individual subscribers.
Using a similar approach to Hermalin and Katz, but making the important adjustments
1See for example Squire (1973), Littlechild (1975), Dhebar and Oren (1985), Einhorn (1993) and Hahn
(2003).
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discussed above (sunk receiver processing cost, separating processing costs from utility, and
constrained receiver prices), we calculate optimal uniform sender and receiver prices and
discuss how and why they differ from those suggested for other networks and from those
suggested by others for email networks (for example Hermalin and Katz (2004)). We also
calculate uniform Ramsey and monopoly prices. Finally we compare the welfare associated
with each pricing regime and with the status quo of zero prices.
Several papers investigate receiver prices in interconnected telephone networks, where the
telephone operators also set interconnection charges calls originating in the competitor’s net-
work (see for example Jeon et. al. (2004), Kim and Lim (2001) and Doyle and Smith (1998)).
The focus of these papers is substantially different from ours because our approach does not
lend itself well for discussing issues around competition. MacDonald and Meriluoto (2005)
examine efficient perfectly discriminatory sender and receiver pricing and access pricing in
telephone networks in the absence of termination charge considerations. Our contribution is
investigating uniform pricing as well as incorporating features specific to email networks into
the model.
We do not attempt to capture the effects of spam in this paper. In fact, we argue that a
model of communication demand with a smooth and continuous distribution of preferences,
as most papers in this area assume, is ill suited for addressing spam for a number of reasons.
Because spam is not targeted to those receivers who value it, most spam messages generate
zero receiver utility. This suggests that one possible way to model spam is to represent it
as a mass point within the non-spam preference distribution. A further complication arises,
however, because with filtering many spam messages that are sent are not received. One
really needs to specifically model the behavior of spammers in the face of email pricing as we
do in Eaton, MacDonald and Meriluoto (2008).
There is another potentially serious flaw associated with modeling email networks with
a continuous message preference distribution. If senders pay a sufficiently negative sender
price, specifically pS < −cS , there is an absolute incentive for senders to construct phoney
messages as a money making activity. This means that there will always be an infinitely
large mass point of messages with, or near, zero sender utility. We avoid this problem by
imposing a the constraint pS ≥ −cS to effectively rule out the possibility that this mass point
would ever be included in optimally exchanged messages. Because the mass point becomes
economically irrelevant in our model we assume it does not exist and instead assume that
the message preference distribution is continuous and well-defined.
The first new insight we derive has to do with social welfare maximising uniform prices.
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The standard result is that given network effects, the price of a message would be set equal
to the cost of the message minus its external effect. We show that this intuition will hold for
the sender price and the receiver price in their best response function form. However, when
the two prices are solved for simultaneously, the resulting prices will incorporate not just
the external effect and the cost of the message but also preferences of the sender/receiver
as well. This is true for not only the welfare-maximising prices but also the Ramsey prices
and profit-maximising prices, but the weights on the sender’s/receiver’s own utility and the
external effect will be different for the three different prices.
We discuss the circumstances under which it is efficient to use sender pricing alone,
receiver pricing alone or sender and receiver prices together. When the maxima in the
preference distributions are relatively symmetric, both prices are positive if the maxima and
not too large but equal their minima at pR = 0 and pS = −cS when the the maxima are large.
For asymmetric distributions where senders’ utility is larger than receivers’ utility, sender
price is likely to be positive while the receiver price is zero. For asymmetric distributions
where receivers’ utility is larger than senders’ utility, receiver price is likely to be positive
while the receiver price equals its minimum at negative the of sender’s processing cost.
We show that the two optimal uniform prices are asymmetric even when the preferences
for sending and receiving messages are distributed identically and independently by a uniform
distribution. Given such a preference distribution the receiver pays more than the sender
and both efficient prices decrease with the maximum in the preference distribution to the
point where, if the maximum is sufficiently large, the efficient receiver price is equal to zero
and the sender subsidy is equal to the sender’s processing cost.
If the maxima in the preference distributions are sufficiently large the sum of the efficient
receiver and sender prices does not cover the ISP’s costs. We examine the uniform Ramsey
prices, i.e. efficient prices given an ISP break-even constraint. The Ramsey prices behave very
similarly to the efficient uniform prices with the exception that they reach their minima at a
lower level of maxima in the preference distributions and these minima are higher (because
they have to cover the ISP cost) than the efficient price minima.
Monopoly prices, however, behave quite differently from efficient uniform and Ramsey
prices. They are smaller than efficient prices when the maxima in the message preference
distributions are small, but because they increase without bound with the message preference
maxima while the efficient prices decrease until they reach their minima, the monopoly prices
quickly surpass the efficient prices. The non-negativity constraint for monopoly prices are
binding only for very asymmetric distributions.
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The main welfare results for identical uniform distributions are as follows. The efficient
uniform prices generate welfare that is, perhaps surprisingly, close to the maximum welfare
achievable by perfectly discriminatory pricing. Ramsey prices generate welfare that is lower
than or equal to the welfare with efficient uniform prices, but this welfare is never too far
from the maximum achievable welfare. The status quo of zero prices generates poor welfare
results when the message preference maxima are small (because positive prices are required
to discourage inefficient message exchange) but the performance of zero prices improves as
the message preference maxima increase. Monopoly prices, however, do well only for a small
range of parameter values when the monopoly prices equal or are close to the efficient uniform
prices. Monopoly welfare can be negative (despite monopoly profit being positive) when the
message preference maxima are small. When the maxima are large, the ratio of monopoly
welfare to the maximum achievable welfare becomes relatively constant, at 55− 64% of the
maximum achievable welfare in our numerical examples.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model assumptions
on preferences and costs. Section 3 describes the total and private surpluses of messages
given some arbitrary sender and receiver prices, and describes what are the constraints set
by the email technology on prices. Section 4 describes the general conditions for uniform
welfare maximizing prices, Ramsey prices and monopoly prices. Section 5 presents uniform
welfare maximizing prices, Ramsey prices and monopoly prices for a uniform distribution.
Section 6 presents the comparative welfare analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model set-up
2.1 Preferences
The composition of the network is fixed and every consumer in the network has the ability
to both receive and send messages. Consumers choose whether or not to send messages to
other consumers, and if they receive a message from another consumer, they choose whether
or not to open and read it.
A message from sender s to receiver r is completely described by the pair (σ, ρ), where
σ is the benefit the sender gets if the message is read, and ρ is the benefit the receiver gets
from reading the message.2 We place no sign restrictions on these benefits – both σ and ρ
can be positive, negative, or zero. Of course, if the message is not read, the realized benefits
2When an email turns up in someone’s inbox, the heading allows the receiver to identify the sender and the
subject of the message. Based on this information, the receiver chooses to either open or delete the message.
In effect, the receiver is making an inference about the value of the message to her, and it seems reasonable to
suppose that her inference is correct. So we assume that the information in the message heading is sufficient
to enable the receiver to correctly estimate ρ.
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of both parties are 0.
We describe the potential benefits of the email network by a density functionM(σ, ρ). The
potential benefits are of course realized if and only if the message is sent by the sender, and
opened and read by the receiver. We assume that the density function is continuous, which
implies that it has no mass points. We assume that σ and ρ are independently distributed
by f(σ) and g(ρ) with support in σ ∈ [σmin, σmax] and in ρ ∈ [ρmin, ρmax], respectively, so
that M(σ, ρ) = f(σ)g(ρ). The density functions f and g correspond to cumulative density
functions F and G, respectively.
2.2 Costs
We assume that for any outgoing message, the sender incurs a constant processing cost cS .3
Of course, when the message is sent, the ISP incurs a transmission cost, which we denote by
cU . This cost is incurred regardless of whether or not the receiver actually opens or reads the
message.4 In addition, when the message shows up in the receiver’s inbox, the receiver incurs
a processing cost cR, regardless of whether or not she reads the message.5 This processing
cost is the cost incurred when the receiver chooses to either open or delete the message.
Finally, if the message is read the receiver incurs an additional reading cost. Since the cost
is incurred if and only if the benefit is also received, we include it in the receiver’s benefit.
That is to say, ρ is the receiver’s gross benefit, less the cost of reading the message.
Notice that for every message that is sent, and regardless of whether it is read, there is
a constant per message cost C = cU + cS + cR. Since two components of this costs are not
incurred by the sender, efficiency is problematic.
3This assumption is equivalent to that of Loder et. al. and effectively also to that of Hermalin and Katz
who assume that the preference parameters are net of any cost associated with sending or opening and reading
a message.
4This assumption differs from that made by the existing literature of telephone pricing and email pricing.
As the cost of a telephone call is realized only if the call is answered and therefore the physical connection
is made, it is sensible to assume that the network provider’s cost requires both the caller and receiver to
act. In email networks, however, a message is transmitted without the receiver’s consent, and consumes
bandwidth whether or not it is read. However, the literature on email pricing has not previously adopted
our assumption. Hermalin and Katz (2004) assume a per message cost m which is incurred only if the sent
message is accepted. Loder et. al. (2006) do not include an ISP cost. In perfect information equilibrium,
however, both approaches are equivalent because in our model messages are sent only if the sender anticipates
them to be read. However, if we introduce asymmetry of information, such as would be reasonable at least if
some network participants were spammers who do not know which consumers will respond to their message,
the assumption of the ISP cost being incurred regardless or whether or not the receiver reads the message
becomes important. In fact, the ISP cost of unwanted spam is one of the major costs of spam.
5In contrast, Loder et. al. (and effectively Hermalin and Katz due to the cost being lumped up with
the benefit of reading a message) assume that this cost is incurred only if the receiver reads the message.
Thus, their assumption is very much in line with the current telephone technology but not with the email
technology. This assumption will affect the main results of the model.
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2.3 Information
We assume that the benefit density functionM(σ, ρ), the cost parameters (cU , cS , and cR) and
the prices that the ISP charges are common knowledge. We assume that the ISP observes
any messages that are sent, the identity of the sender and the receiver, and whether the
message is deleted or opened by the receiver, but it does not observe whether the message is
or is not read.
3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section we construct the welfare of a message and total network welfare functions. We
start by defining the total surplus of a message and deriving the function for first-best network
welfare. We then introduce sender and receiver prices and argue that there are lower bounds
on the set of feasible prices. We demonstrate the efficiency trade-off of using arbitrary prices
(as opposed to zero prices). Last, we argue that first-best network welfare is not achievable
through even perfectly discriminatory pricing due to the lower bounds on feasible prices and
construct the second-best welfare subject to the constraints on prices. Later in Sections 4
and 5 we discuss three types of uniform prices (welfare-maximizing prices, Ramsey prices and
monopoly prices) for general preference distributions and for uniform distributions. Last,
in Section 6 we compare the network welfare of the three types of uniform prices to zero
prices (status quo) as well as the second best network welfare assuming uniform preference
distributions.
3.1 Total surplus of a message and first-best network welfare
The total surplus of a message that is sent and read is
ss(σ, ρ) = σ + ρ− (cS + cR + cU ) (1)
= σ + ρ− C
Since the the realized benefits of both parties are 0 when a message is not read, the total
surplus of a message that is sent and not read is −(cS + cR + cU ). The total surplus of a
message that is not sent is, of course, 0.
Cost-benefit optimality requires that a message be sent and read if and only if ss(σ, ρ) ≥ 0,
or if ρ ≥ C − σ. It is, of course, never optimal for a message to be sent and not read.
Figure 1 illustrates a possible message space, given our assumptions of network prefer-
ences. Messages in the cross hatched area on and above the line ρ ≥ C − σ are efficient and
those in the area below the line are inefficient.
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Notice that in this illustration, there exist efficient messages such that either the sender’s
or the receiver’s benefit is negative.6 In the upper-left portion of the cross hatched area,
where σ < 0, the sender’s benefit is negative, and the in the lower-right portion of the
crosshatched area, where ρ < 0, the receiver’s benefit is negative.
ρ
σ
C
C
ρ = C − σ
b b
bb
(σmax, ρmax)
(σmax, ρmin)(σmin, ρmin)
(σmin, ρmax)
C − ρmax
C − ρmin
Figure 1: Possible message space. Welfare-improving messages form the cross-hatched area.
The first-best network welfare is given by
W ∗∗∗a =
∫ σmax
σ=C−ρmax
∫ ρmax
ρ=C−σ
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ (2)
if σmin ≤ C − ρmax, ρmin ≤ C − σmax, ρmax > C and σmax > C and by
W ∗∗∗b =
∫ C−ρmin
σ=σmin
∫ ρmax
ρ=C−σ
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ
+
∫ σmax
σ=C−ρmin
∫ ρmax
ρ=ρmin
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ (3)
if σmin > C − ρmax, ρmin > C − σmax, ρmax > C and σmax > C.
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3.2 Prices, choices and network welfare
Our main purpose is to examine the role that prices might play in a network environment.
We consider both sender pays and receiver pays prices, which we denote by pS and pR. We
6This analysis is the same as in Loder et. al. (2006). However, in Hermalin and Katz (2004), the message
space is restricted to the positive quadrant.
7There are clearly other possible constraint combinations that lead to a slightly different functional form
for the first-best network welfare. In Figure 1, σmin < C− ρmax, ρmin > C − σmax, ρmax ≥ C and σmax ≥ C
and the first-best welfare is W ∗∗∗c =
∫ C−ρmin
σ=C−ρmax
∫ ρmax
ρ=C−σ
(ρ+ σ−C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ +
∫ σmax
σ=C−ρmin
∫ ρmax
ρ=ρmin
(ρ+
σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ.
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assume that receiver pays prices are paid if and only if the receiver actually opens the message
– to assume otherwise violates the spirit of voluntary exchange. Messages that are sent and
read give the sender and receiver the following private surpluses:
sS = σ − cS − pS (4)
and
sR = ρ− cR − pR.
When the receiver makes a decision to open a message at stage 2,8 cR is sunk and thus her
surplus becomes
sR = ρ− pR. (5)
When at stage 3 the receiver decides whether or not to read a message that was opened at
stage 2, pR is sunk as well and the relevant surplus is
sR = ρ. (6)
A message is opened and read only if both (5) and (6) are non-negative, that is if ρ ≥
max[pR, 0]. Subsequently, negative prices cannot achieve what they are set out to do (that is,
induce receivers to read unwanted messages) and therefore all efficient prices satisfy pR ≥ 0.
Sender’s choose to send a message if the surplus in (4) is non-negative, that is if σ ≥ cS+pS,
and if the sender anticipates the message to be read, that is if ρ ≥ max(pR, 0). The second
condition assures that the potential benefit σ is realized.
Suppose now that the sender’s benefit is negative (σ < 0). In this case, the necessary
condition for the efficient sender price is pS < −cS. However, such a price creates a perverse
incentive to manufacture and send phoney messages (that give the sender zero utility) as,
in effect, a commercial activity. For this reason we restrict sender pays prices to the set
{pS|pS ≥ −cS}.9
Given arbitrary uniform prices (pS , pR), messages in the following set will be exchanged
SR(pS , pR) ≡ {(σ, ρ)|σ ≥ cS + pS , ρ ≥ max(pR, 0)}. (7)
The total network welfare with such prices is given by
W =
∫ σmax
σ=pS+cS
∫ ρmax
ρ=pR
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ, (8)
8Remember that the ISP can observe if the message is opened but not if it is read, and thus pR is charged
if the message is opened.
9As discussed in the introduction, this assumption allows us not to have to worry about the incentive to
manufacture phoney messages and thus to have a well-defined message preference space. Prices that satisfy
pS < −cS could not maximize welfare due to this incentive to create an infinite number of messages that
generate at most zero value to the society, and thus this assumption that is made for convenience is not
restrictive.
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which after integrating by parts can be expressed as
W =
[
ρmax − p
RG(pR)−
∫ ρmax
pR
G(ρ)dρ
] (
1− F
(
pS + cS
))
+
[
σmax −
(
pS + cS
)
F
(
pS + cS
)
−
∫ σmax
pS+cS
F (σ)dσ
] (
1−G
(
pR
))
− C
(
1− F
(
pS + cS
)) (
1−G
(
pR
))
. (9)
The first line in (9) is the realized surplus of receivers. The first term in the first line is the
expected receiver value of the messages that the receivers would willingly read. The second
term scales for the fact that only a proportion of the messages are sent. The second line is
the realized surplus of senders. The first term on the second line is the expected sender value
of messages that the sender would willingly send if they were read, and the second term is
the proportion of these messages that are actually read. The last line is the total cost of all
messages sent and received. The cross-hatched area in Figure 2 illustrates the messages that
are exchanged with arbitrary uniform prices that satisfy our constraints.
ρ
σ
C
C
ρ = C − σ
b b
bb
(σmax, ρmax)
(σmax, ρmin)(σmin, ρmin)
(σmin, ρmax)
pR
pS + cS
b
b
b
b
bb
a k
l
m
n
f
i
g
o
b
b
b b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
bb
b
c
d eh
j
q
cS
Figure 2: Messages that are sent and read given uniform prices pS and pR
The current situation where the uniform prices equal zero implies that the messages that
are exchanged are clearly not the efficient set. Figure 3 illustrates the current situation.
Messages in abc and in defg are efficient but not exchanged if zero prices are used, while
messages in cdh are inefficiently exchanged.
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ρσ
C
C
ρ = C − σ
b b
bb
(σmax, ρmax)
(σmax, ρmin)(σmin, ρmin)
(σmin, ρmax)
cS
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
bb
a b
c
d e
f
i
g
h
j
Figure 3: Messages that are sent and read given zero prices
The total welfare of zero pricing is given by
W zero =
[
ρmax −
∫ ρmax
0
G(ρ)dρ
] (
1− F
(
cS
))
+
[
σmax − c
SF
(
cS
)
−
∫ σmax
cS
F (σ)dσ
]
(1−G (0))
− C
(
1− F
(
cS
))
(1−G (0)) . (10)
if σmax > cS and it is zero otherwise. It is not obvious that we are doing as well as we can
with the current pricing regime. The efficiency trade-off that arises with arbitrary uniform
prices compared to zero uniform prices pS and pR is illustrated back in Figure 2. We can see
that these prices improve efficiency by eliminating unwanted messages in clomdqh but the
trade-off is that efficient messages in bklc and mned are no longer exchanged.
3.3 Feasible perfectly discriminatory pricing and second best net-
work welfare
We have determined earlier that pR ≥ 0 because messages with ρ < 0 cannot be induced to
be read with negative receiver prices and that pS ≥ −cS because otherwise there would be an
incentive to generate phoney messages. Given these restrictions, it is not always possible to
achieve efficient message exchange even if perfectly discriminatory prices are contemplated.
Figure 4 illustrates the set of efficient message exchanges that could be achieved with perfectly
discriminatory prices when these considerations are taken into account.
The welfare that prevails under perfectly discriminatory pricing, which we call second-best
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ρσ
C
C
ρ = C − σ
b b
bb
(σmax, ρmax)
(σmax, ρmin)(σmin, ρmin)
(σmin, ρmax)
Figure 4: The set of efficient message exchanges that could be achieved with perfectly dis-
criminatory prices
network welfare, is given by
W ∗∗a =
∫ C
σ=0
∫ ρmax
ρ=C−σ
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ
+
∫ σmax
σ=C
∫ ρmax
ρ=0
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ (11)
if σmax ≥ C and ρmax ≥ C. If σmax < C and ρmax < C but σmax + ρmax ≥ C, this second
best network welfare is given by
W ∗∗b =
∫ σmax
σ=C−ρmax
∫ ρmax
ρ=C−σ
(ρ+ σ − C)g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ. (12)
We can see that perfectly discriminatory pricing does better than no pricing in that it would
stop the inefficient messages in cdh in Figure 3 from being exchanged as well as induce the
efficient messages in jbcC to be exchanged. However, the efficient messages in ajC and in
defg cannot be induced to be exchanged even with perfectly discriminatory pricing, given
the nature of the message technology in email networks. This important aspect has not been
noted in the literature before.
Furthermore, discriminatory pricing requires the ISP to know the utility of communication
for both parties in every single potential message. Clearly, this pricing scheme requires too
much information to be practical to implement. Uniform pricing, however, only requires the
ISP to know the distribution of message preferences and not the preferences of each individual
message, a much lighter information requirement than that for perfectly discriminatory prices.
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In the following section we derive the conditions for three pairs of uniform prices - those that
maximize total welfare, Ramsey prices and those that maximize profits in Sections 4.
4 Optimal uniform prices
In this section we will discuss three types of optimal uniform prices. Each of these price
pairs is at best second best in that given these prices some welfare-reducing messages are
exchanged and some welfare-enhancing messages are not exchanged.
First we derive and discuss the uniform prices that maximize network welfare. Our non-
negativity constraints imply that the interior solution prices are only valid for some regions in
the parameter space (roughly speaking relatively symmetric message preference distributions
where the preference maxima are not too large) and that there are a number of possible corner
solutions as well. These solutions are explored further for a specific uniform distribution
in Section 5.1 In some instances (but not always, as we will show) the welfare-maximizing
uniform prices lead to ISP losses being made. Therefore, as is the custom in the literature, we
also derive the conditions for Ramsey prices, i.e. uniform prices that maximize total welfare
subject to ISP break-even constraint. On top of the usual interior solution Ramsey prices our
non-negativity constraints lead to us having several corner solutions again. Also, whenever
unconstrained (in terms of the ISP break-even constraint) welfare-maximizing prices lead
to positive ISP profits Ramsey prices equal them. We ignore both sets of constraints here
and only derive the conditions for the interior solution Ramsey prices in this section, but
will derive the full set of solutions when preferences are uniformly distributed in Section 5.2.
Last, we derive the conditions for interior solution profit-maximizing prices for a monopoly
ISP, and all the possible solutions are presented for uniform distribution in Section 5.3.
4.1 Cost-benefit optimal uniform sender and receiver prices
We first investigate the combination of uniform sender and receiver prices that maximize
network welfare. These prices are, as discussed before, constrained: pS ≥ −cS and pR ≥ 0.
The usual first order conditions for the maximization of (9) w.r.t. pS and pR yield the
following expressions that we call best-response functions:10
pS = C −
(
ρmax − p
RG
(
pR
)
−
∫ ρmax
pR
G(ρ)dρ
)
1−G (pR)
− cS (13)
10These prices are not set by competing firms and therefore this is an unconventional use of the term.
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and
pR = C −
(
σmax −
(
pS + cS
)
F
(
pS + cS
)
−
∫ σmax
pS+cS F (σ)dσ
)
1− F (pS + cS)
. (14)
These best response functions show that the sender’s price is set to equal the total cost of
the message minus the expected receiver value of the messages minus the sender’s processing
cost and that the receiver price is set to equal the total cost of messages minus the expected
sender value of the messages. Notice the asymmetry in the two prices caused by the fact that
the receiver’s processing cost is sunk but the sender’s processing cost is not.
Equations (13) and (14) jointly define the efficient prices when neither constraint ( pS ≥
−cS and pR ≥ 0) on prices is binding.
Other solutions exist when one or both of these constraints bind. These are
pS = −cS (15)
and
pR = C −
(
σmax −
∫ σmax
0
F (σ)dσ
)
1− F (0)
(16)
when (13) violates its constraint,
pS = C −
(
ρmax −
∫ ρmax
0
G(ρ)dρ
)
1−G (0)
− cS (17)
and
pR = 0 (18)
when (14) violates its constraint, and
pS = −cS (19)
and
pR = 0 (20)
when both (13) and (14) violate their constraints. These optimal prices are explored in more
detail for a specific uniform distribution in Section 5.
4.2 Ramsey prices
Consider now the welfare-maximizing prices subject to the ISP’s break-even constraint, that
is, the Ramsey prices. Most research in communication network pricing show that efficient
prices do not cover the network provider’s cost. We also show for the case of uniform distri-
bution that the efficient prices sum up to less than the total cost of the message. However,
as only a part of the total cost of a message is ISP cost, this inequality does not necessarily
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mean that the ISP would not break even. We will discuss this further in subsection 5.2 where
we examine Ramsey prices for a uniform distribution.
Assume for now that the efficient prices do not cover all ISP costs. Given that the break-
even constraint will be binding, the Ramsey price can be obtained by substituting the ISP’s
break-even constraint pR + pS = cU into the welfare in (9):
WRamsey =[
ρmax − (c
U − pS)G(cU − pS)−
∫ ρmax
(cU−pS)
G(ρ)dρ
] (
1− F
(
pS + cS
))
+
[
σmax −
(
pS + cS
)
F
(
pS + cS
)
−
∫ σmax
pS+cS
F (σ)dσ
] (
1−G
(
cU − pS
))
− C
(
1− F
(
pS + cS
)) (
1−G
(
cU − pS
))
. (21)
The FOC that implicitly defines the Ramsey price is:11
(1− F (pS + cS))g(cU − pS)(cU − pS)
−f(pS + cS)
[
ρmax − (c
U − pS)G(cU − pS)−
∫ ρmax
(cU−pS)
G(ρ)dρ
]
−(1−G(cU − pS))f(pS + cS)(pS + cS)
+g(cU − pS)
[
σmax −
(
pS + cS
)
F
(
pS + cS
)
−
∫ σmax
pS+cS
F (σ)dσ
]
+C
[
(1−G(cU − pS))f(cS + pS)− (1− F (pS + cS))g(cU − pS)
]
= 0. (22)
Equation (22) can be interpreted as follows. Lines 1 and 2 represents the rate of change
(w.r.t. increasing pS) in the realized surplus of receivers. Line 1 is the rate of change in
realized receiver surplus caused by the effective reduction in the receiver price (because the
sum of the sender and the receiver price is constant) keeping the number of messages sent
constant, and line 2 is the rate of change in receiver surplus caused by the reduction of the
number of messages sent keeping the expected receiver surplus per message constant. Lines
3 and 4 represents the rate of change in the realized surplus of senders. Line 3 is the rate of
change in realized surplus caused by the rising sender price keeping the number of messages
read constant, and line 4 is the rate of change in consumer surplus of sent messages caused
by the increase in the number of messages that are read due to the resulting reduction in
receiver pays price. Line 5 represents the rate of change in the total cost of the exchanged
messages caused by the change in the composition of messages that are both sent and read.
The first term is the rate of change in cost caused by the reduction in the messages that are
11We are ignoring the constraints on prices in this section but will look at them closely when deriving
Ramsey prices for a uniform distribution in subsection 5.2.
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sent keeping the messages that are willingly read constant, and the second term is the rate
of change in cost caused by the increase in the messages that are read keeping the messages
that are sent constant.
Rearranging the FOC (22) yields the following:
g(cU − pS)(1 − F (pS + cS))
(
C − cU + pS −
σmax − (p
S + cS)F (pS + cS)−
∫ σmax
pS+cS
F (σ)dσ
1− F (pS + cS)
)
= f(pS + cS)(1−G(cU − pS))
(
C − pS − cS −
ρmax − (c
U − pS)G(cU − pS)−
∫ ρmax
cU−pS
G(ρ)dρ
1−G(cU − pS)
)
(23)
Thus, the Ramsey sender price (and thus effectively the receiver price) is set such that the
rate of change in total welfare caused by the increase in messages that are willingly read
equals the rate of change in welfare caused by the reduction in messages that are willingly
sent.
4.3 Monopoly prices
The profit of a monopolist ISP is given by
pi(pS , pR) =
∫ σmax
pS+cS
∫ ρmax
pR
(pR + pS − cU )g(ρ)f(σ)dρdσ
= [1−G(pR)][1− F (pS + cS)](pR + pS − cU ). (24)
Maximizing (24) with respect to pR and pS yields the following FOCs 12
f(pS + cS)(pR + pS − cU ) = [1− F (pS + cS)]. (25)
and
g(pR)(pR + pS − cU ) = [1−G(pR)] (26)
that jointly define profit-maximising prices for a single firm. As usual, the monopolist must
balance the decreased quantity of messages with the increase in revenue on infra-marginal
messages.
5 Optimal uniform prices when preferences are distributed
uniformly
Let us now consider a specific distribution function for the message preferences. Assume that
σ is distributed uniformly in σ ∈ uni [σmin, σmax] with density equal to
1
(σmax−σmin)
and ρ is
distributed uniformly in ρ ∈ uni [ρmin, ρmax] with density equal to
1
(ρmax−ρmin)
. Notice that
12We are again ignoring the constraints on prices but will look at them closely when deriving monopoly
prices for a uniform distribution in subsection 5.3.
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the density functions are independent but not necessarily identical. Uniform distribution
exhibits everywhere increasing hazard rate, that is, is log-concave, and thus is a special case
of a group of distributions considered by Hermalin and Katz (2004).
5.1 Cost-benefit optimal uniform prices when preferences are dis-
tributed uniformly
Assuming that pR ≥ 0 and pS ≥ −cS , all the messages for which ρ ∈ [pR, ρmax] and
σ ∈ [pS + cS , σmax] will be send and read and the surplus of each such message is ρ+ σ−C.
The total surplus, obtained by substituting the specific density functions into (9), is
W =
(
ρmax − p
R
) (
σmax −
(
pS + cS
))
2(ρmax − ρmin)(σmax − σmin)
(
ρmax + p
R + σmax + p
S + cS − 2C
)
. (27)
Maximising (27) w.r.t. pS + cS and pR subject to the constraints 0 ≤ pS + cS ≤ σmax and
0 ≤ pR ≤ ρmax yields the following best-response functions:
pS + cS = C −
ρmax
2
−
pR
2
(28)
and
pR = C −
σmax
2
−
pS + cS
2
. (29)
There is an intuitive graphical interpretation to these best response functions. Equation
(28) can be rewritten as ρmax−C − (p
S + cS) = C − (pS + cS)− pR where the left-hand-side
is the distance k − l and the right-hand-side is the distance l − o in Figure 2. Similarly,
equation (29) can be rewritten as σmax −C − p
R = C − pR − (pS + cS) where the left-hand-
side is distance n − m and the right-hand-side is distance m − o in Figure 2. Thus, the
first-order conditions require that the prices are set such that at each margin, the number
of messages that deteriorate welfare equals the number of messages that improve welfare.
Any further increase in sender or receiver price would lead to the elimination of more “good”
messages than of “bad” messages and thus overall welfare would go down. These conditions
together with the assumption on independent distributions imply that the distribution of
the exchanged messages will be a square when prices are chosen optimally and when the
constraints for the prices are not violated. 13
All the solutions to this pricing problem, the resulting welfare and the parameter restric-
tions for each solution are given in Table 5.1.
13The first order condition w.r.t. pS + cS can also be expressed as ρmax−C+(p
S+cS)
(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
=
C−(pS+cS)−pR
(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
which more clearly shows the general graphical interpretation of the FOCs: the
line integral of the message space from n to l must be equal to the line integral from l to m. Similar
interpretation can be given to the first order condition w.r.t. pR.
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region restrictions pS∗ pR∗ W ∗
a max[−2C + 2σmax, C − σmax] ≤ ρmax ≤ C +
σmax
2
2C
3 −
2ρmax
3 +
σmax
3 − c
S 2C
3 −
2σmax
3 +
ρmax
3
4(ρmax+σmax−C)
3
27(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
b σmax < min [−2C + 2ρmax, 2C] −c
S C − σmax2
σmax(2ρmax+σmax−2C)
2
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
c ρmax < min [−2C + 2σmax, 2C] C −
ρmax
2 − c
S 0 ρmax(2σmax+ρmax−2C)
2
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
d σmax ≥ 2C and ρmax ≥ 2C −c
S 0 ρmaxσmax(σmax+ρmax−2C)
2(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
e ρmax < C − σmax > σmax − c
S > ρmax 0
Table 1: Different optimal pricing solutions, their parameter restrictions and resulting welfare
1
9
Figure 5 illustrates the different solutions as the maxima of the message preference dis-
tributions varies.
ρmax
σmax
ρmax = −2C + 2σmax
ρmax = C +
1
2σmax
2C
2C
C
C
a
b
c
d
e
Figure 5: Parameter support for different solutions for welfare-maximizing prices.
When both σmax and ρmax are larger than 2C the exchange of messages should be encour-
aged by setting prices at their minima because, on average, the value of a message is greater
than the cost of the message for both the sender and receiver. Setting prices above their
minima would lead to a larger welfare loss due to eliminating “good” messages than a wel-
fare gain due to eliminating “bad” messages. When both σmax and ρmax are small, there are
more “bad” messages than “good” messages at minimum prices, and therefore higher prices
increase welfare. When ρmax ≤ min[−2C + 2σmax, 2C], receivers do not value messages very
much compared to the cost of messages but senders do. Since a positive sender price elimi-
nates messages with a small value to the sender and because the expected receiver value ρmax2
is small in this case, a sender price increases welfare. Receiver price is not used because even
if it would eliminate messages with small receiver value, these eliminated messages have a
high expected value σmax2 to the sender. Similarly, when σmax ≤ min[−2C + 2ρmax, 2C]ρmax,
senders do not value messages very much compared to the cost of those messages but receivers
do. Since a positive receiver price eliminates messages with a small value to the receiver and
because the expected sender value σmax2 is small in this case, a receiver price increases wel-
fare. The sender price is set at its minimum because even if a higher price would eliminate
messages with small sender value, these eliminated messages have a high expected value ρmax2
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to the receiver.
The two efficient prices sum up to
pS∗ + pR∗ =
4cU + cS + 4cR − σmax − ρmax
3
(30)
for the interior solution, and they cover the total cost of a message if
ρmax ≤ C − 3c
S − σmax. (31)
As the participation constraint of consumers is violated everywhere where (31) holds, the
interior solution prices never cover the total cost of messages. It is trivial to see that the
prices in the other solutions never cover the cost of the message, either.
Consider now identical distributions for message preferences, that is ρmax = σmax. The
efficient prices are now the interior solution prices pS∗ = 2C3 −
σmax
3 −c
S and pR∗ = 2C3 −
σmax
3
if C2 ≤ σmax ≤ 2C, and the corner solution prices p
S∗ = −cS and pR∗ = 0 if σmax ≥ 2C.
Thus, when the interior solution holds, the receiver price is positive and falling linearly in
σmax and when σmax ≥ 2C we get the corner solution price p
R = 0. The sender price is set
below the receiver price by the amount of the sender’s processing cost. The efficient prices
sum up to pS∗ + pR∗ = 4C3 −
2σmax
3 − c
S for the interior solution and to pS∗ + pR∗ = −cS
for the corner solutions. Given that σmax ≤ 2C, the efficient prices sum up to less than the
full cost of the message. However, it is not clear that they do not cover the ISP cost cU .
In fact, the ISP makes non-negative profit whenever σmax <
C+3cR
2 . We will later examine
Ramsey prices to show that the asymmetry result in efficient prices prevails once we impose
a break-even constraint for the ISP.
Let us now determine how the efficient prices are affected when we make a distribution
less symmetric. First, assume that max[−2C + 2σmax, C − σmax] ≤ ρmax ≤ C +
σmax
2 , i.e.
that we are inside area a in Figure 5 where the interior solution prices found on row a in
Table 5.1 hold. Now let σmax increase keeping ρmax constant - that is, move to the right on
a horizontal line from the starting point inside area a. This implies that the average sender
value of a message increases but the average receiver value stays constant, and thus that we
are stretching the uniform distribution to the right simultaneously reducing the density at
any point. This change will increase the optimal sender price and reduce the optimal receiver
price until σmax = C +
ρmax
2 (the boundary between areas a and c) when the optimal sender
price equals pS∗+cS = C− ρmax2 and the optimal receiver price equals zero. Any increases on
σmax thereafter have no impact on the optimal prices. Similarly, starting from an initial point
inside area a, let ρmax increase keeping σmax constant - that is, move up a vertical line from
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the starting point inside area a. The optimal receiver price increases and the optimal sender
price decreases until ρmax = C+
σmax
2 when the optimal receiver price equals p
R∗ = C− σmax2
and the optimal sender price equals pS∗ = −cS, and any increases thereafter have no impact
on the optimal prices.
Last, as an example, assume that σmax = 1.2C and ρmax = 1.5C. The optimal prices
are now ((pS + cS)∗, pR∗) = (0.2C3 ,
1.1C
3 ) and they are illustrated in Figure 6. The shaded
area includes all sent messages of which the messages in the crosshatched area reduce total
surplus. Notice that the prices are set such that the shaded area is a square. Also, for the
messages at the left and bottom boundaries of the sent message space (where the senders are
indifferent between sending and not sending a message and where the receivers are indifferent
between reading and not reading a message, respectively), there is an equal number of good
and bad messages. This graphical explanation holds for other distributions as well.
ρ
σ
C
C
ρmax = 1.5C
σmax = 1.2C
pR∗ = 1.1C3
pS∗ + cS = 0.2C3
Figure 6: Efficient prices with uniform distribution when ρmax = 1.5C and σmax = 1.2C
The graphical interpretation can also be used to explain why optimal prices are set to
their minima in other cases. If the price that would set the number of good messages equal
to the number of bad messages at either left or the lower boundary of the sent message space
is below its lower bound, the optimal price is set equal to its minimum.
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5.2 Ramsey prices when preferences are distributed uniformly
Standard Ramsey prices are found by substituting the ISP break-even constraint pR = cU−pS
into network welfare in (27):
WRamsey =
σmax + ρmax − c
R − C
2(ρmax − ρmin)(σmax − σmin)
(
(ρmax − c
U + pS)(σmax − p
S − cS)
)
(32)
and then maximizing w.r.t. pS subject to our minima constraints for prices. The Ramsey
pricing solutions are presented in Table 5.2.
All the solutions in Table 5.2 are illustrated in Figure 7. The standard Ramsey prices
(area f) hold only when σmax and ρmax are sufficiently symmetric and large. The ISP break-
even constraint is binding but prices are constrained because the standard Ramsey prices
are too negative in areas g and h. The unconstrained welfare-maximizing prices generate
sufficient income to the ISP in area aR where σmax and ρmax are relatively symmetric but
small. Last, in areas bR and cR where tastes are very asymmetric and one of the maxima
is small, the corner solution welfare-maximizing prices generate non-negative profit for the
ISP.14
ρmax
σmax
ρmax = −2C + 2σmax
ρmax = C +
1
2σmax
C
C
aR
bR
cR
2cR
2cR
C + 3cR
C + 3cR
ρmax = C − c
R + σmax
ρmax = −C + c
R + σmax
g
h
f
e
Figure 7: Parameter support for optimal Ramsey prices
If the uniform distributions are identical, such that ρmax = σmax, then the interior solution
Ramsey prices in area f in Figure 7 satisfy pSRamsey =
cU−cS
2 <
cU+cS
2 = p
R
Ramsey and
14Note: Areas aR, bR and cR are subsections of areas a, b and c in Figure 5, and area e is the same as in
Figure 5.
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region restrictions pS,Ramsey pR,Ramsey WRamsey
aR max[−2C + 2σmax, C − σmax] ≤ min[ρmax ≤ C +
σmax
2 , C + 3c
R − σmax]
2C
3 −
2ρmax
3 +
σmax
3 − c
S 2C
3 −
2σmax
3 +
ρmax
3
4(ρmax+σmax−C)
3
27(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
bR σmax < min
[
−2C + 2ρmax, 2c
R
]
−cS C − σmax2
σmax(2ρmax+σmax−2C)
2
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
cR ρmax < min
[
−2C + 2σmax, 2c
R
]
C − ρmax2 − c
S 0 ρmax(2σmax+ρmax−2C)
2
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
e ρmax < C − σmax > σmax − c
S > ρmax 0
f max[C + 3cR − σmax,−C + c
R + σmax] ≤ ρmax ≤ C − c
R + σmax
cU+σmax−ρmax
2 −
cS
2
cU+ρmax−σmax
2 +
cS
2
(σmax+ρmax−C+c
R)2(σmax+ρmax−C−c
R)
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
g 2cR < ρmax < −C + c
R + σmax −c
S cU + cS σmax(ρmax−c
U
−cS)(σmax+ρmax−2C+c
S+cU )
2(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
h 2cR < σmax < −C + c
R + ρmax c
U 0 ρmax(σmax−c
U
−cS)(σmax+ρmax−2C+c
S+cU )
2(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
Table 2: Ramsey pricing solutions, their parameter restrictions and resulting welfare
2
4
it is clear that the Ramsey prices are asymmetric such that the receivers pay more than
the senders even with perfectly symmetric message preference distributions. Furthermore,
increasing σmax = ρmax does not affect the level of the interior solution Ramsey prices.
5.3 Monopoly prices when preferences are distributed uniformly
Given our uniform distributions, the ISP profit in (24) can be written as
pi(pS , pR) =
(σmax − (p
S + cS))(ρmax − p
R)(pR + pS − cU )
(σmax − σmin)(ρmax − ρmin)
. (33)
The different pricing solutions are given in Table 5.3.
Figure 8 shows the regions in the parameter space where the different solutions hold. The
interior solution is highlighted in yellow.
ρmax
σmax
C − cR
ρmax = C − c
R + 2σmax
C − cR
ρmax =
−C+cR
2 +
σmax
2
i
j
k
epi
Figure 8: Monopoly prices as functions of σmax and ρ
max.
Intuitively, if one maximum in the preference distribution space is very large while the
other one is small, it would make sense to subsidize the consumers with small utility to en-
courage them to send or open messages to allow the consumers with large utility to exchange
more messages. However, as feasible prices have a lower bound, this can only be done within
the bounds of feasible prices.
As with cost-benefit optimal prices and Ramsey prices, if the message preference distri-
butions are perfectly symmetric (σmax = ρmax) the uniform monopoly prices are asymmetric
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region restrictions pS,pi pR,pi Wpi pi
i max[−C+c
R
2
+ σmax
2
, C − cR] ≤ ρmax ≤ C − cR + 2σmax
2σmax−ρmax
3
+ c
U−2cS
3
2ρmax−σmax
3
+ c
U+cS
3
(ρmax+σmax−c
S−cU )2(2ρmax+2σmax−3C+c
S+cU )
27(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
(ρmax+σmax−c
U−cS)3
27(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
j ρmax < C − c
R + sσmax −cS
ρmax
2
+ c
U+cS
2
σmax(ρmax−c
S−cU )(2σmax+3ρmax−4C+c
S+cU )
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
σmax(ρmax−c
S−cU )2
4(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
k ρmax <
−C+cR
2
+ σmax
2
σmax
2
+ c
U−cS
2
0
ρmax(σmax−c
S−cU )(2ρmax+3σmax−4C+c
S+cU )
8(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
ρmax(σmax−c
S−cU )2
4(ρmax−ρmin)(σmax−σmin)
epi ρ
max < C − cRσmax > σmax − c
S > ρmax 0 0
Table 3: Monopoly prices, their parameter restrictions and resulting welfare and profit
2
6
such that the sender pays less than the receiver by an amount equal to the sender’s pro-
cessing cost: pS∗ = σmax3 +
cU−2cS
3 <
σmax
3 +
cU+cS
3 = p
R∗. However, while the sum of the
Ramsey prices equate by construction to the ISP cost of the message, the monopoly prices
are larger. Furthermore, monopoly prices increase in σmax = ρmax without bound whereas
the cost-benefit optimal prices and Ramsey prices decrease in σmax = ρmax first and then
become constant.
Figure 9 combines the constraints of uniform total welfare-maximizing, Ramsey and
monopoly pricing. In an attempt to keep the Figure as free of clutter as possible, we have
not identified the regions where various pricing solutions hold, so this figure needs to be read
in conjunction with Figures 5, 7 and 8.
ρmax
σmax
ρmax = C +
1
2σmax
ρmax = −2C + 2σmax2C
2C
C
C
2cR
2cR
C + 3cR
C + 3cR
ρmax = C − c
R + σmax
ρmax = −C + c
R + σmax
C − cR
ρmax = C − c
R + 2σmax
C − cR
ρmax =
−C+cR
2 +
σmax
2
Figure 9: Parameter support for the various solutions for the three types of prices.
6 Welfare comparison of the results for uniform distri-
bution
In this section we explore how the different price types, and resulting welfare, compare with
each other and with the status quo (zero prices). For the welfare analysis we compare the
ratio of the actual welfare resulting from a particular pricing strategy to the best achievable
welfare in the network, that is the second best welfare measure that results from using
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perfectly discriminatory prices that satisfy the constraints pR > 0 and pS > −cS . In part
the aim of this section is to provide a framework for evaluating whether or not the current
regime of using zero prices is likely creating significant welfare losses.
6.1 Symmetric message distributions
Here we look at symmetric distributions where σmax = ρmax and σmin = ρmin. Given these
restrictions and our uniform distribution, we can express the second best welfare in (11) and
(12), achievable through perfectly discriminatory prices which are limited to be pS ≥ −cS
and pR ≥ 0 , by
W ∗∗1 =
C3 − 6Cσ2max + 6σ
3
max
6(σmax − σmin)2
(34)
if σmax ≥ C and by
W ∗∗2 =
(2σmax − C)
3
6(σmax − σmin)2
(35)
if σmax < C.
The optimal uniform prices are pS∗a =
2C−σmax
3 − c
S and pR∗a =
2C−σmax
3 if
C
2 ≤ σmax ≤
2C and pS∗d = −c
S and pR∗d = 0 if σmax > 2C. The corresponding welfares are W
∗
a =
4(2σmax−C)
3
27(σmax−σmin)2
and W ∗d =
(σmax−C)σ
2
max
(σmax−σmin)2
(from rows a and d in Table 5.1, respectively).
Ramsey pricing involves using the unconstrained optimal uniform prices pS∗aR =
2C−σmax
3 −
cS and pR∗aR =
2C−σmax
3 if
C
2 ≤ σmax ≤
C+3cR
2 , and the Ramsey prices p
S,Ramsey
f =
cU−cS
2 and
p
R,Ramsey
f =
cU+cS
2 if σmax >
C+3cR
2 . The corresponding welfares are W
∗
a =
4(2σmax−C)
3
27(σmax−σmin)2
andWRamseyf =
(2σmax−c
U
−cS)2(2σmax−C−c
R)
(σmax−σmin)2
(from rows aR and f in Table 5.2, respectively).
The uniform monopoly prices are pS,pii =
σmax+c
U
−2cS
3 and p
R,pi
i =
σmax+c
U+cS
3 , which
generates welfare equal to Wpii =
(2σmax−c
U
−cS)2(4σmax−2C−c
R)
27(σmax−σmin)2
(from row i in Table 5.3.
Last, the welfare with zero prices is
W zero =
σmax(σmax − c
S)(2σmax − 2C + c
S)
2(σmax − σmin)2
. (36)
Figure 10 shows the three types of price pairs as a function of σmax = ρmax. Figure
11 plots the welfare functions from optimal uniform pricing, Ramsey pricing and uniform
monopoly pricing as ratios to the second best welfare when σmax = ρmax varies. Both figures
assume the same set of cost parameters. Figures 12 and 13 show how the welfare comparisons
change when the relative sizes of the cost parameters change. Figures 14 and 15 show the
three types of prices and welfare comparisons for a more asymmetric taste structure.
It is evident that optimal uniform prices do fairly well in mimicking second best pricing.
For the first set of parameters, these prices achieve at least 89 % of the potential maximum
welfare, and this ratio approaches 100% as σmax increases. Ramsey prices are identical to
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the optimal uniform prices when the break-even constraint is not binding. When the break-
even constraint is binding, for σmax >
C+3cR
2 , the welfare generated using Ramsey prices
suffers in relation to the difference in cS and cU . When both are small, as is likely to be the
case for email networks, there is not a substantial difference between the unconstrained and
constrained total welfare-maximizing prices.
The comparison of the welfare generated by uniform monopoly pricing to other pricing
regimes is more fascinating. First, when σmax is relatively small (but greater than
C
2 ) the
monopolist charges small prices and is able to make positive profits even though it is totally
optimal to discourage all email activity. As σmax increases in the range
C
2 < σmax <
C+cR
2
the monopoly prices are increasing in magnitude and approaching the optimal and Ramsey
prices so there is convergence in these welfare ratios. Uniform monopoly prices are the same
as the uniform optimal prices when σmax =
C+cR
2 . For σmax >
C+cR
2 , monopoly prices are
large compared to uniform optimal prices and so the welfare under monopoly prices falls
away again from that generated by other pricing strategies. Thus, a monopoly ISP does
rather well when the maxima in the preference distributions are close to C+c
R
2 but poorly
otherwise and, importantly, worse than zero pricing for σmax >
C+3cR
2 .
The other interesting comparison is zero pricing (status quo) to second best. When σmax
is very small, zero prices result in negative total welfare. As σmax increases the optimal
uniform sender and receiver prices approach −cS and 0 respectively and so the welfare loss
associated with zero prices becomes small.
pS , pR
σmax = ρmax
5C
pR∗
2C
0
−cS = −.55 pS∗
pRpi
pSpi
pRRamsey
cU+cS
2
cU−cS
2
pSRamsey
1.025C
2
Figure 10: Optimal uniform, Ramsey and monopoly prices as functions of σmax = ρmax.
cU = 0.1, cS = .55, cR = .35 (C = 1) and σmin = ρmin = −2
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Figure 11: W
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as a function of σmax = ρmax for optimal uniform, Ramsey, monopoly and
zero prices. cU = 0.1, cS = .55, cR = .35 (C = 1) and σmin = ρmin = −2
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Figure 12: W
W∗∗
as a function of σmax = ρmax for optimal uniform, Ramsey, monopoly and
zero prices. cU = 0.35, cS = .55, cR = .1 (C = 1) and σmin = ρmin = −2
6.2 Asymmetric message distributions
Now we look at distributions where senders get more utility for messages than receivers do.
Specifically, assume that σmax = 2ρmax and σmin = 2ρmin. Given these assumptions and
our uniform distribution, we can express the second best welfare in (11) and (12), achievable
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through perfectly discriminatory prices which are limited to be pS ≥ −cS and pR ≥ 0 , by
W ∗∗1 =
4C3 − 12Cσ2max + 9σ
3
max
12(σmax − σmin)2
(37)
if σmax ≥ 2C, by
W ∗∗2 =
σmax(12C
2 − 30Cσmax + 19σ
2
max)
24(σmax − σmin)2
(38)
if C < σmax < 2C, and by
W ∗∗3 =
(3σmax − 2C)
3
24(σmax − σmin)2
(39)
if 2C3 ≤ σmax ≤ C.
The optimal uniform prices are now pS∗a =
2C
3 − c
S and pR∗a =
2C
3 −
σmax
2 if
2C
3 ≤ σmax ≤
4C
3 , p
S∗
c = C −
σmax
4 − c
S and pR∗c = 0 if
4C
3 < σmax < 4C, and p
S∗
d = −c
S and pR∗d = 0
if σmax ≥ 4C. The corresponding welfares are W
∗
a =
(3σmax−2C)
3
27(σmax−σmin)2
, W ∗c =
σmax(5σmax−4C)
2
32(σmax−σmin)2
and W ∗d =
σ2
max
(3σmax−4C)
2
4(σmax−σmin)2
(from rows a, c and d in Table 5.1, respectively).
Ramsey pricing involves the unconstrained optimal uniform prices pS∗a =
2C
3 − c
S and
pR∗a =
2C
3 −
σmax
2 if
2C
3 ≤ σmax ≤
2C
3 + 2c
R, the interior solution Ramsey prices pS,Ramseyf =
σmax+2c
U
−2cS
4 and p
R,Ramsey
f =
2cU+2cS−σmax
4 if
2C
3 + 2c
R < σmax < 2C − 2c
R, and corner
solution Ramsey prices pS,Ramseyh = c
U and pR,Ramseyh = 0 if σmax > 2C − 2c
R. The cor-
responding welfares are W ∗a =
(3σmax−2C)
3
27(σmax−σmin)2
, WRamseyf =
(3σmax−2C+2c
R)2(3σmax−2C−2c
R)2
16(σmax−σmin)2
and WRamseyh =
σmax(σmax−c
U
−cS)(3σmax−4C+2c
S+2cU )
4(σmax−σmin)2
. (from rows a, f and h in Table 5.2,
respectively).
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The uniform monopoly prices are pS,pii =
3σmax+2c
U
−4cS
6 and p
R,pi
i =
cU+cS
3 generating
welfare Wpii =
(3σmax−2C+2c
R)2(3σmax−2C−c
R)
54(σmax−σmin)2
(from row i in Table 5.3.
Last, the welfare with zero prices is
W zero =
σmax(σmax − c
S)(3σmax − 4C + 2c
S)
4(σmax − σmin)2
. (40)
Figure 14 plots the three types of prices and Figure 15 plots the welfare ratios as functions
of σmax = 2ρmax for a given set of cost parameters. It is evident that total welfare maximizing
uniform prices do fairly well in mimicking perfectly discriminatory pricing. For the first set
of parameters, these prices are achieve at least 89 % of the achievable welfare, and this
ratio approaches 100 % as σmax increases. Ramsey prices are the total welfare maximizing
prices for σmax ≤
C+3cR
2 , but beyond that point do somewhat worse due to the break-even
constraint becoming binding. However, as the total welfare maximizing prices sum up to
−cS when σmax ≥ 2C, and because Ramsey prices always sum up to c
U , both of which are
likely to be small, there is not a great amount of difference between the unconstrained and
constrained total welfare-maximizing prices.
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Figure 14: Optimal uniform, Ramsey and monopoly prices as functions of σmax = 2ρmax.
cU = 0.1, cS = .55, cR = .35 (C = 1) and σmin = ρmin = −2
The comparison of the welfare generated by uniform monopoly pricing to second best total
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welfare is more interesting. First, when σmax is small, the ratio is negative reflecting the fact
that the ISP chooses to operate when total welfare is negative. The prices the ISP charges
are smaller than the total welfare maximizing prices for σmax ≤
C+cR
2 . In that region, as
σmax increases, the total welfare maximizing prices fall and the monopoly prices rise leading
to monopoly welfare doing relatively well compared to uniform total welfare-maximization at
first. The monopoly prices equal the welfare-maximizing prices at σmax =
C+cR
2 , and beyond
that the monopoly prices surpass the total welfare-maximizing prices leading to the welfare
ratio to plunge until it settles at around %56 when σmax = 5C. Thus, a monopoly ISP does
rather well when the maxima in the preference distributions are small, but quite poorly when
the maxima are large.
The other interesting comparison is zero pricing (status quo) to second best. When σmax
is small, zero prices result in many total welfare reducing messages being exchanged leading
to negative total welfare. As σmax increases, however, the total welfare maximizing uniform
prices fall and get closer to the status quo, zero prices. Thus, zero prices do reasonably well
when σmax is large but not so well when it is small.
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Figure 15: W
W∗∗
as a function of σmax = 2ρmax for uniform, Ramsey, monopoly and zero
prices. cU = 0.1, cS = .55, cR = .35 (C = 1) and σmin = 2ρmin = −2
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how the nature of email technology affects the level of efficient
and monopoly prices as well as the optimal mix between sender and receiver pricing. The
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first-best outcome may not be achievable even with perfectly discriminatory prices because
consumers cannot be induced to read efficient messages with negative receiver prices and
there is a limit in the size of the subsidy that can induce senders to send efficient messages.
Efficient uniform sender prices are decreasing in the magnitude of maximum sender value
of the message distribution and at a minimum are equal to the negative of the sender’s
processing cost. Efficient uniform receiver prices are similarly decreasing in the magnitude
of the maximum receiver value and at a minimum are equal to zero. Even with perfectly
symmetric message preference distributions the optimal uniform prices are asymmetric in
that the receiver pays more than the sender. However, the sender price is relatively large
compared to the receiver price when the message preference distribution has a lot of mass
for messages with high sender value and low receiver value.
The sum of the efficient uniform receiver and sender prices fails to cover all the message
costs but does cover the ISP’s costs when one or both the maxima in the message prefer-
ence distributions are sufficiently small. With symmetric message preference distributions,
the efficient prices given an ISP break-even constraint are constant in the maximum of the
distributions. These prices are also asymmetric so that receivers pay more than senders do.
Monopoly prices are also asymmetric in that receivers pay more than the senders when
the message preference distributions are symmetric. Given such a distribution, the monopoly
prices increase without bound as the maximum of the message preference distributions is
increased.
Finally we show that uniform and Ramsey prices generally get closest to the second-
best welfare (welfare generated by perfectly discriminatory prices subject to non-negativity
constraints). Zero prices have the smallest welfare loss when the message preference maxima
are large relative to the message costs, in which case zero prices are close to the optimal
uniform prices. Monopoly prices, however, do well only for a small range of parameter values
when the monopoly prices equal or are close to the efficient uniform prices. When the maxima
in the message preference distributions get larger than these values, the ratio of monopoly
welfare to the second best welfare first declines fast but then becomes fairly steady at 55-65
% in our examples.
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